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THE INTERNET WILL NOT BREAK: DENYING BAD SAMARITANS SECTION 230 IMMUNITY 
 
Danielle Keats Citron and Benjamin Wittes* 
 
Abstract 
 
What do a revenge pornographer, gossip-site curator, and platform pairing 
predators with young people in one-on-one chats have in common? Blanket 
immunity from liability, thanks to lower courts’ interpretation of section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA) beyond what the text, context, and purpose 
support. The CDA was part of a campaign—rather ironically in retrospect—to 
restrict access to sexually explicit material online. Lawmakers thought they were 
devising a safe harbor for online providers engaged in self-regulation. The CDA’s 
origins in the censorship of “offensive” material are inconsistent with outlandishly 
broad interpretations that have served to immunize from liability platforms 
dedicated to abuse and or those that deliberately tolerate illegality.  
 
In contrast to a strike-oriented view of the CDA’s safe harbor, its modest revision 
will not break the “Internet.” Whether this would have been true at the time of its 
passage two decades ago, it would not be true today. Conditioning immunity from 
liability on reasonable efforts to address unlawful activity would not end innovation 
or free expression as we know it. The current environment of perfect impunity for 
platforms deliberately facilitating online abuse is not a win for free speech because 
harassers speak unhindered while the harassed withdraw from online interactions. 
With modest adjustments to section 230, either through judicial interpretation or 
legislation, we can have a robust culture of free speech online without shielding 
from liability platforms designed to host illegality or who deliberately host illegal 
content. 
 
Introduction 
 
The social media site Omegle sports the jaunty slogan, “Talk to Strangers!” The site’s 
front page announces that it is “a great way to meet new friends. When you use 
Omegle, we pick someone else at random and let you talk one-on-one.”  
 
Omegle is not exactly a social media site for sexual predators, but it’s fair to say that a 
social network designed for the particular benefit of the predator community would 
look a lot like it. The site itself seems to understand this. In the first opening 
                                               
* Citron is the Morton & Sophia Macht Professor of Law at the University of Maryland Francis King 
Carey School of Law and Wittes is the editor in chief of Lawfare and a Senior Fellow in Governance 
Studies at the Brookings Institution. We are grateful to Mary Anne Franks and Carrie Goldberg for their 
feedback as well as to the participants in the Hoover Institution’s conference on the power of platforms. 
Much thanks to Fordham Law Review and Alexander Tsesis for hosting the “Terrorist Incitement on the 
Internet” symposium and including us in this volume. 
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paragraph—the same one where the site proclaims itself a great way to meet new 
friends—it warns that “Predators have been known to use Omegle, so please be 
careful.” The site’s legal disclaimer, also on its front page, specifically warns: 
“Understand that human behavior is fundamentally uncontrollable, that the people you 
encounter on Omegle may not behave appropriately, and that they are solely responsible 
for their own behavior. Use Omegle at your own peril.” As to Omegle’s video chat, the site 
warns that, “Omegle video chat is moderated. However, moderation is not perfect. You 
may still encounter people who misbehave. They are solely responsible for their own 
behavior.”1 
 
Omegle’s disclaimer of responsibility for its users’ “misbehavior” might sound like 
magical thinking. After all, the site has specifically warned young users that Omegle 
might be pairing them with sexual predators for one-on-one chats. But, however absurd 
the claim may seem, the site is accurately describing its immunity from liability for 
whatever happens. Under the prevailing interpretation of Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act, the site’s users—even sexual predators preying on 
children—are “solely responsible for their own behavior.” No matter that the site was 
clear-eyed that its service might be putting sexual predators in contact with children. As 
most courts have understood the statute, Omegle would enjoy broad immunity from 
liability arising from user-generated content.2 This would probably be true even if 
Omegle changed its slogan to “Forbidden Fun with Boys and Girls!” 
 
Dirty.com is a site devoted to spreading gossip, often about college students. The site’s 
founder, Nik Richie, has encouraged readers to email him “dirt” on people they know. 
Richie pastes his favorite emails in blog posts, often alongside images showing ordinary 
people “scantily clad, inebriated, and unfaithful.”3 Posts have led to a torrent of abuse, 
with commenters accusing the subjects of “dirt” of having sexually transmitted 
infections, psychiatric disorders, and financial problems.4 Richie has admittedly “ruined 
people sometimes out of fun.”5 That admission is not against interest—he knows well 
that he cannot be sued for his role in the abuse because what users do is on them. 
Courts applying section 230’s immunity provision have dismissed efforts to hold Richie 
responsible for defamatory posts that have damaged lives and careers.6  
 
                                               
1 OMEGLE, http://www.omegle.com/. 
2 As we explore in this piece, a handful of cases have refused to immunize providers from liability 
because they were not being sued for having published user-generated content but rather for failing to 
warn about a specific threat. See Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. May 31, 2016).  
3 Kate Knibbs, Cleaning Up The Dirty, THE RINGER (Apr. 19, 2017), https://theringer.com/the-dirty-nik-
richie-gossip-site-relaunch-4a086aa24536. 
4 Kashmir Hill, The Dirty Business: How Gossipmonger Nik Richie Stays Afloat, FORBES (Nov. 11, 2010), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2010/11/11/the-dirty-business-how-gossipmonger-nik-
richie-of-thedirty-com-stays-afloat/#b29403a62f9b.  
5 Knibbs, supra note. 
6 See, e.g., Dyer v. Dirty World LLC, No. CV-11-0074-PHX-SMM, 2011 WL 2173900 (D. Ariz. June 2, 2011). 
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Now consider the relationship between social media companies with terrorist groups. 
Last year, one of us (Wittes) undertook a survey of overseas groups that were formally 
designated as foreign terrorist groups yet still had active social media accounts. Federal 
law allows civil and criminal penalties for providing material support—including 
anything of value—to designated foreign terrorist groups. Yet numerous designated 
terrorist groups, including Hamas, Hezbollah, the PKK, and Lakshar-e-Taiba, openly 
maintained an online presence on well-known social media services, including 
Facebook and Twitter; several of those accounts were suspended after publication of the 
article.7 Yet because of section 230’s immunity provision, efforts to hold social media 
companies responsible under the civil provisions of the federal material support statute 
have consistently failed.8 
 
We offer the modest proposition that section 230 immunity is too sweeping. In physical 
space, a business that arranged private rooms for strangers to meet knowing that sexual 
predators were using its service to meet kids would have to do a great deal more than 
warn people to proceed “at their own peril” to avoid liability when bad things 
happened. A physical magazine devoted to publishing user-submitted malicious gossip 
about non-public figures would face a blizzard of lawsuits as false and privacy-
invading materials harmed people’s lives. And a company that knowingly allowed 
designated foreign terrorist groups to use their physical services would face all sorts of 
lawsuits from victims of terrorist attacks. Something is out of whack—and requires 
rethinking—when such activities are categorically immunized from liability merely 
because they happen online. 
 
This was not, as highlighted below, what Congress had in mind in 1996 when it 
adopted the Communications Decency Act (CDA). The CDA was part of a broad 
campaign—rather ironically in retrospect—to restrict access to sexually explicit material 
online.9 Lawmakers thought they were devising a limited safe harbor from liability for 
online providers engaged in self-regulation. Because regulators could not keep up with 
the volume of noxious material online, the participation of private actors was 
essential.10  
 
Courts, however, have extended this safe harbor far beyond what the provision’s 
words, context, and purpose support.11 Lower courts have ironically applied section 
                                               
7 Zoe Bedell & Benjamin Wittes, Tweeting Terrorists, Part I: Don’t Look Now but a Lot of Terrorist Groups Are 
Using Twitter, LAWFARE (Feb. 14, 2016), https://lawfareblog.com/tweeting-terrorists-part-i-dont-look-
now-lot-terrorist-groups-are-using-twitter. 
8 Cohen v. Facebook, Nos. 16-CV-4453, 16-CV-5158, 2017 WL 2192621 (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 2017) (dismissing 
claims based on federal material support statute against Facebook because failure to remove Hamas 
postings concerned defendant’s role as publisher of online content and thus fell within section 230(c)(1)’s 
immunity provision); Fields v. Twitter, 200 F. Supp. 3d 964 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2016). 
9 S. REP. NO. 104-23, at 59 (1995). 
10 141 CONG. REC. H8469-70 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (remarks of Rep. Cox).   
11 Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 116 (2009). 
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230, entitled “[p]rotection for private blocking and screening of offensive material,” to 
protect from liability sites designed to purvey offensive material.12 The CDA’s origins in 
the censorship of “offensive” material and protections against abuse are inconsistent 
with outlandishly broad interpretations that have served to immunize platforms 
dedicated to abuse and others that deliberately tolerate users’ illegal activities.  
 
Section 230 is overdue for a rethinking. If courts do not construe the scope of federal 
immunity to avoid injustice, we argue, Congress should amend the law. This is not to 
discount the important role that the immunity provision has played over the past 
twenty years.13 Far from it. Section 230 immunity has enabled innovation and 
expression beyond the imagination of the operators of early bulletin boards and 
computer service providers the provision was designed to protect.  
 
But its overbroad interpretation has left victims of online abuse with no leverage against 
sites whose business model is abuse. This state of affairs can be changed without 
undermining free expression and innovation. Having broad protections for free speech 
and clear rules of the road is important for online platforms to operate with confidence. 
Section 230, at least as it is currently understood, is not necessary for either of these. 
With modest adjustments to section 230, either through judicial interpretation or 
legislation, we can have a robust culture of free speech online without shielding from 
liability platforms designed to host illegality or who deliberately host illegal content. 
 
I.Origin Story: What Section 230 was Meant To Do 
  
The CDA, part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, was by no stretch of the 
imagination a libertarian enactment.14 It consisted of a broad attack on sexually-explicit 
material disseminated through various media.15 Indeed, it strayed so far from 
libertarian values that the Supreme Court in landmark First Amendment case struck 
down several of its provisions.16 When the CDA addressed private actors, as it did in 
section 230, it was not to give them impunity for helping third parties abuse each other. 
                                               
12 Id. 
13 DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014). 
14 Id.; Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 116 (2009) (exploring CDA generally 
and section 230 specifically). 
15 S. REP. NO. 104-23, at 59 (1995). 
16 United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803 (2000); ACLU v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). In Reno, 
the Supreme Court struck down provisions of the CDA that criminalized the “knowing" transmission of 
obscene or indecent messages to underage recipients. 521 U.S. at 849. Internet expression, the Court 
explained, was too important to be limited only to what is fit for children. Id. at 864. The Court struck 
down those parts of the CDA as violations of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment. 
Id.  
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It was, rather, “to encourage telecommunications and information service providers to 
deploy new technologies and policies” to block or filter offensive material.17  
 
To understand what Congress was trying to do when it passed section 230, it is helpful 
to start with the case that prompted its adoption: Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services.18 
Prodigy, an early online service provider, used software to filter profanity in the hopes 
that it would attract families to its services.19 A user of Prodigy’s services posted 
defamatory comments about a securities firm on a financial bulletin board. The firm 
sued Prodigy, arguing that it was strictly liable as the publisher of the defamation. 
Prodigy responded that it could not possibly edit the thousands of daily messages 
posted to its bulletin boards as a traditional publisher would. The trial court sided with 
the financial firm to the tune of $200 million. The coup de grace was that Prodigy lost its 
protection as a mere distributor and gained liability as a publisher because it had tried 
to remove objectionable material but had done so incompletely.20 
  
The Prodigy decision caught the attention of lawmakers who wanted as much 
”indecent” material as possible removed from the internet so it would be safe for 
children.21 The court’s somewhat perverse reliance on Prodigy’s filtering efforts to 
establish its liability for defamation (of which it had no idea) sufficiently disturbed 
Congress to move legislators act to immunize such activity. The concern was that 
holding online service providers liable for inexact screening would not result in 
improved screening, but rather in no screening at all. This is because providers could 
avoid publisher liability if they acted as purely passive conduits. This possibility was 
anti-thetical to lawmakers who believed that controlling the volume of noxious material 
online exceeded the capa-city of public regulatory agencies.22 As lawmakers saw it, self-
regulation was essential to tackling objectionable content. 
 
                                               
17 S. REP. NO. 104-23, at 59 (1995). As Representative Cox put it, “protect[ing] computer Good Samaritans, 
online service providers, anyone who provides a front end to the Internet, let us say, who takes steps to 
screen indecency and offensive material for their customers  . . . from taking on liability such as occurred 
in the Prodigy case in New York that they should not face for helping us and for helping us solve this 
problem.” 141 CONG. REC. H8469 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995). 
18 Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). 
19 Id. at *1. 
20 Id. 
21 As Representative Bob Goodlatte explained: “Currently, however, there is a tremendous disincentive 
for online service providers to create family friendly services by detecting and removing objectionable 
content. These providers face the risk of increased liability where they take reasonable steps to police 
their systems. A New York judge recently sent the online services the message to stop policing by ruling 
that Prodigy was subject to a $200 million libel suit simply because it did exercise some control over 
profanity and indecent material.” 141 CONG. REC. H8471 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995).   
22 141 CONG. REC. H8469-70 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (remarks of Rep. Cox); see Danielle Keats Citron, 
Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 116 n.377 (2009) (discussing history of section 230’s adoption and 
goal of drafters).   
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In 1995, Senators J. James Exon and Slade Gorton introduced the Communications 
Decency Act. Under existing law, common carriers were exempt from liability if they 
acted in good faith to restrict obscene material.23 The Senate Committee’s bill extended 
this immunity to online service providers to incentivize the adoption of “new 
technologies and policies” restricting access to offensive material.24   
  
In the House of Representatives, Christopher Cox and Ron Wyden offered an 
amendment providing immunity from liability for online service providers that 
restricted access to objectionable material.25 The House Rules Committee, which 
allowed consideration of the Cox-Wyden amendment, described that provision as 
“protecting from liability those providers and users seeking to clean up the Internet.”26 
 
The final version of section 230 of the CDA reflects this policy objective, not a broader 
objective of immunizing platforms for destructive third-party content they knowingly 
tolerate. Entitled “protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material,” 
section 230 codifies the Cox-Wyden Amendment.27 Section 230(c)(1) addresses the 
problem of under-screening, exemplified by Prodigy, by providing that, “no provider or 
user of interactive computer services shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by an information content provider.”28 Section 230(c)(2) specifies 
broad protections for over-screening: “no provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be held liable on any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access 
to material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, 
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material 
is constitutionally protected.”29 Section 230(e)(3) preempts contrary state laws but does 
not “prevent any State from enforcing any State law that is consistent with this 
                                               
23 47 U.S.C. § 223(c)(2) (1994). 
24 S. 652, 104th Cong. § 402(d) (proposed to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)(5)). Senator Exon included 
similar language in a floor amendment that the Senate accepted before passing S. 652. 141 CONG. REC. 
S8386 (daily ed. June 14, 1995) (proposed to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 233(f)(4)).  
25 H.R. REP. NO. 104-223, Amendment No. 2-3 (1995) (proposed to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230). 
Representative Cox described it as “protect[ing] computer Good Samaritans, online service providers, 
anyone who provides a front end to the Internet, . . . who takes steps to screen indecency and offensive 
material for their customers.” 141 CONG. REC. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995). Representative Danner 
found the Cox-Wyden Amendment “a reasonable way to provide those providers of the information to 
help them self-regulate themselves without penalty of law.” Id.   
26 H.R. REP. NO. 104-223, at 3 (1995) (emphasis added). 
27 Section 502 of the final legislation contained the Senate’s additions to 47 U.S.C. § 223. Section 509 
contained the House’s new section 230. Pub. L. No. 104-104; see H.R. REP. NO. 104-458 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). 
28 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). The conference report described the provision as securing immunity for “Good 
Samaritans” engaged in blocking or filtering of objectionable content online. H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 193 
(1996) (Conf. Rep.).  
29 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2). 
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section.”30 Federal criminal law, intellectual property law, and the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act are not covered by the immunity provision.31 
 
II. Fortress Built in the Courts 
  
From these humble beginnings, courts have built a mighty fortress protecting platforms 
from accountability for unlawful activity on their systems—even when they actively 
encourage such activity or deliberately refuse to address it. The Supreme Court has 
declined to weigh in on the meaning of section 230, but state and lower federal courts 
have reached a “near-universal agreement” that it should be construed broadly.32  
 
Courts attribute a broad sweeping approach to the fact that “First Amendment values 
drove the CDA.”33 As one court recently put it, “Congress did not sound an uncertain 
trumpet when it enacted the CDA, and it chose to grant broad protections to internet 
publishers.”34 For support, courts have pointed to section 230’s “findings” and “policy” 
sections, which highlight, among other things, the importance of the “vibrant and 
competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet” and the Internet’s role 
facilitating “myriad avenues for intellectual activity.”35 
 
All of this ignores the plain reality that the “core policy of section 230(c)(1)” was to 
protect “Good Samaritan blocking and screening of offensive material.”36 The 
                                               
30 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3).  
31 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(f). 
32 Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 2016) (citing cases from the 1st, 5th, 9th, 
and 11th Circuits). 
33 Id. at 29. 
34 Id. 
35 See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Sections 230(a)(3) and 230(b)(2) for the 
proposition that free speech values underlie immunity provision). Section 230(b)(2) declared it federal 
policy to preserve “vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other 
interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.” Although this section has been 
invoked to support the proposition that no rules should constrain the Internet, a close reading shows it 
refers to the marketplace of services, not the figurative marketplace of ideas. Congress did not want the 
FCC or the states to regulate Internet access fees. Three paragraphs later, Congress made clear it was 
anything but anti-regulatory when it comes to online abuse, enunciating a federal policy “to ensure 
vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and 
harassment by means of computer.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(5). Regrettably, federal stalking and harassment 
laws have not been enforced as vigorously as Congress hoped. Citron, supra note, at 83–90; Danielle Keats 
Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2009). There 
are, however, exceptional federal prosecutors devoted to combating the problem, including Mona Sedky 
and Wesley Hsu. See Interview of Mona Sedky with Benjamin Wittes, LAWFARE (June 26, 2016), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-mona-sedky-prosecuting-sextortion; Kashmir Hill, The 
Cyber Prosecutor Sending Nude-Photo Thieves to Prison, FORBES, July 31, 2014, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/07/31/federal-prosecutor-nude-photo-
hackers/#41fb88e2ed6c. 
36 Doe v. Internet Brands, 824 F.3d 846, 851–52 (9th Cir. 2016). 
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judiciary’s long insistence that the CDA reflected “Congress' desire to promote 
unfettered speech on the Internet”37 so ignores its text and history as to bring to mind 
Justice Scalia’s admonition against selectively determining legislative intent in the 
manner of someone at a party who “look[s] over the heads of the crowd and pick[s] out 
[their] friends.”38  
 
A. Breadth of the Immunity 
 
We recognize that the language of section 230(c)(1) is by its terms broad. It does not, 
after all, explicitly limit the liability shield it creates to those companies that actually 
engage in some measure of Good Samaritan blocking or screening. While the intent of 
the provision—to make sure that companies that do some measure of blocking are 
immunized for the stuff they miss in section 230(c)(1) and are immunized for the act of 
blocking itself in section 230(c)(2)—is clear from history and context, the language of 
230(c)(1) admittedly sweeps more broadly than that, reaching online service providers 
more generally.  
 
But even with that recognition, the broad construction of CDA’s immunity provision 
adopted by the courts has produced an immunity from liability far more sweeping than 
anything the law’s words, context, and history support.39 Platforms have been protected 
from liability even though they republished content knowing it might violate the law;40 
encouraged users to post illegal content;41 changed their design and policies to enable 
illegal activity;42 or sold dangerous products.43 As a result, hundreds of decisions have 
extended section 230 immunity, with comparatively few denying or restricting it.44 
                                               
37 Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327, 334 (4th Cir. 1997). 
38 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 36 (1997). 
39 See, e.g., GoDaddy LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014); DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE 
CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 171 (2014). Courts have narrowly construed when platforms fall outside section 
230’s safe harbor because they co-created content. Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates, 521 F.3d 1157, 1167–
68 (9th Cir. 2008). Only platforms that “materially contribute” to content’s development, such as by 
paying for it or requiring users to post it, are ineligible for the safe harbor. Id.; FTC v. Accusearch, 570 
F.3d 1187, 1192, 1199 (10th Cir. 2009). 
40 Shiamili v. Real Estate Group of New York, 952 N.E.2d 1011 (N.Y. 2011); Phan v. Pham, 105 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 791 (App. Ct. 2010) (extending Section 230 immunity to defendant who forwarded defamatory email 
and added comment that “everything would come into daylight”). 
41 Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Holding, 755 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2014) (rejecting plaintiff’s contention that 
soliciting gossip constituted co-development of illegal content); S.C. v. The Dirty LLC, No. 11-CV-00392-
DW, 2012 WL 3335284 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 12, 2012); Dyer v. Dirty World LLC, No. CV-11-0074-PHX-SMM, 
2011 WL 2173900 (D. Ariz. June 2, 2011). 
42 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016).  
43 See, e.g., Hinton v. Amazon, 72 F. Supp. 3d 685, 687 (S.D. Miss. 2014) (granting dismissal on section 230 
grounds because “claims against eBay arise or stem from the publication of information on 
www.ebay.com created by third parties”). 
44 Ambika Doran & Tom Wyrwich, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act Turns 20, LAW 360 (Sept. 
7, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/836281/section-230-of-the-communications-decency-act-
turns-20. 
8 
 
Consider Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com.45 Sex trafficking victims sued Backpage—a 
classifieds hub hosting “80 percent of the online advertising for illegal commercial sex 
in the United States.”46 Plaintiffs alleged that Backpage did not enjoy section 230 
immunity for their sexual assault because it had deliberately structured its service to 
enable sex trafficking.47 Evidence showed that defendant had selectively removed 
postings discouraging sex trafficking and tailored its rules to protect the practice from 
detection, including allowing anonymized email and photographs stripped of 
metadata.48 Nonetheless, the court held that Backpage enjoyed immunity from liability, 
even as it recognized that plaintiffs’ evidence was “persuasive.”49 The court reasoned 
that, “[s]howing that a website operates through a meretricious business model is not 
enough to strip away those protections.”50 
 
Neither the text of the statute nor its history require sweeping immunity from liability 
for sites like Backpage. It was, after all, part of the Communications Decency Act. Section 
230 of the CDA was by no means meant to immunize services whose business is the 
active subversion of online decency—businesses that are not merely failing to take 
“Good Samaritan” steps to protect users from online indecency but are actually being 
Bad Samaritans.  
 
Granting immunity to platforms designed in part or in whole for illegal activity would 
seem absurd to the CDA’s drafters. As Judge Frank Easterbrook noted in a case 
involving an alleged violation of fair housing laws, such an expansive interpretation 
does not harmonize with the “decency” name of the CDA because broad protection 
induces online computer services to “do nothing about the distribution of indecent and 
offensive materials.”51  
 
In the technology world, section 230 of the CDA is a kind of sacred cow—an 
untouchable protection of near constitutional status.52 It is, in some circles anyway, 
credited with having enabled the development of the modern internet.53 We are not 
                                               
45 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016); see also Backpage.com, LLC v. McKenna, No. C12-954 RSM, 2012 WL 
4120262, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 18, 2012).  
46 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Jane Doe v. Backpage.com LLC, No. 16-276 (Aug. 31, 2016), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/16-276-cert-petition.pdf. 
47 Backpage, 817 F.3d at 16. 
48 Id. at 17. 
49 Id. at 29. 
50 Id. 
51 Chicago Lawyers Comm. for Civil Rights v. Craigslist, 519 F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2008). 
52 Section 230: The Most Important Law Protecting Internet Speech, EFF BLOG, 
https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230/legal. 
53 Christopher Zara, The Most Important Law in Tech Has a Problem, WIRED (Jan. 3, 2017), 
https://www.wired.com/2017/01/the-most-important-law-in-tech-has-a-problem/; Eric Goldman, 
Online User Account Termination and Section 230(c)(2), 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 659 (2012). 
9 
convinced that courts’ sweeping departure from the law’s words, context, and purpose 
has been the net boon for free expression that the law’s celebrants imagine. The free 
expression calculus devised by the law’s supporters often fails to consider the loss of 
voices in the wake of destructive harassment encouraged or tolerated by platforms.54 
We suspect that the many benefits the immunity has enabled could have been secured 
at a slightly lesser price.55  
 
But now that twenty years have passed, the question is whether the internet will break 
if section 230 is no longer accorded a broad sweeping interpretation. Section 230’s most 
fervent supporters argue that it is “responsible for the extraordinary Internet boom” 
and its evisceration would sound the death knell to innovation.56 To the extent the 
internet needed a broad liability shield when it was young, it certainly needs it no 
longer. Innovation on online platforms can at this point coexist with an expectation that 
platform companies will behave according to some enforceable standard of conduct.  
 
Be that as it may, absent a Supreme Court intervention, the ship may have sailed in 
regards to the judiciary’s interpretation of the current statute. Numerous federal courts 
of appeals have considered section 230, and so far anyway, the courts are in a near 
unanimous agreement that it conveys protection from liability far in excess of what we 
think constitutes reasonable public policy.57 
 
If a broad reading of the safe harbor embodied sound policy in the past, it does not in 
the present—an era in which child (and adult) predation on the internet is rampant, 
cyber mobs terrorize people for speaking their minds, and actual terrorists use online 
                                               
54 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, ONLINE HARASSMENT STUDY 2017 (2017), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/07/11/online-harassment-in-focus-most-recent-experience/ (42% of 
people experiencing severe harassment were “more likely to say they changed their username or deleted 
their profile, stopped attending offline venues or reported the incident to law enforcement”); see Danielle 
Keats Citron, Civil Rights in Our Information Age, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET 31 (Saul Levmore & Martha 
Nussbaum eds., 2010). 
55 Free speech scholar Jack Balkin has assessed section 230 in a measured way: “[Section 230] has had 
enormous consequences for securing the vibrant culture of freedom of expression we have on the Internet 
today. . . . Because online service providers are insulated from liability, they have built a wide range of 
different applications and services that allow people to speak to each other and make things together. 
Section 230 is by no means a perfect piece of legislation; it may be overprotective in some respects and 
underprotective in others. But it has been valuable nevertheless.” Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free 
Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 427, 434 (2009).  
56 Derek Khanna, The Law That Gave Us the Internet and the Campaign to Kill It, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 12, 
2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/09/the-law-that-gave-us-the-modern-
internet-and-the-campaign-to-kill-it/279588/ (citing Eric Goldman). 
57 Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Jones v. Dirty World, 755 F.3d 398, 406 
(6th Cir. 2014); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 422 (5th Cir. 2008); Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 
F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007); Universal Communications Systems, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 
2007); Doe v. GTE Corp, 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2009); Green v. America Online, 318 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 2003); 
Ben Ezra, Weinstein, and Company v. America Online, 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000); Zeran v. America 
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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services to organize and promote violent activities. Unless the Court upends the table, it 
is hard to imagine a retreat from the broad sweeping interpretation of section 230 
adopted in the state and lower federal courts.  
  
B. Radical Changes in the Digital Marketplace  
 
The world of technology companies section 230 protects today, and the activities of 
those companies that it protects, is immensely different from 20 years ago. At the most 
basic level, the companies and their successors are vastly larger, more powerful, and 
less vulnerable than were the nascent “online service providers” of two decades ago. 
They are also providing services very different from, and less obviously about speech, 
than the Prodigy-like services that Congress sought to protect. 
 
Prodigy was, after all, a bulletin board system. The major online platforms of the day 
mostly involved people posting things and expressing opinions about things. The 
platforms could, to some degree, claim that they were passive actors vis-a-vis the 
speech of third-party users. That is still true to a point. Social media providers like 
Twitter and Facebook host the speech of third-party users. Even Omegle is, after all, a 
facilitator of other people’s interactions. It creates chat rooms in which anyone can talk 
about anything. It is not making anyone talk to children about inappropriate sexual 
matters. 
 
But the networked environment today is profoundly different from the one in 1996. 
Twenty years ago, commercial service providers had 12 million subscribers.58 Now 
billions of individuals are online in ways that would have been unimaginable when 
Congress passed the CDA. As Judge Alex Kozinski noted in Fair Housing Council v. 
Roommates.com, ”the Internet has outgrown its swaddling clothes and no longer needs 
to be so gently coddled.”59  
 
In 1996, it was impossible to foresee the threat to speech imposed by cyber mobs and 
individual harassers, whose abuse chills the speech of those unwilling to subject 
themselves to further damage.60 Then, the aggregative power of the internet was not yet 
known.61 Today, huge social networks and search engines enable the rapid spread of 
destructive abuse. If someone posts something defamatory, privacy invasive, and 
threatening about another person, or even about a non-user of a given service, and 
thousands or tens of thousands of people share it, there can be devastating 
consequences whether or not the targeted individual used the service in question.62 
Online abuse is often the first thing employers, clients, and potential dates see in a 
                                               
58 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850–51 (1997). 
59 Fair Hous. Council v. Roomates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1175 n.39 (9th Cir. 2008). 
60 Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note. 
61 Id. 
62 CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note, at. 
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search of a victim’s name. The potential for destruction is exponentially greater today 
than it was twenty years ago. 
 
Moreover, section 230 immunity has been invoked by giant companies engaged in 
enterprises that have little to do with free expression. This is true for Airbnb, which 
facilitates short-term rentals of real estate63 and eBay, which runs an auction site.64 It is 
not hard to see section 230’s immunity being asserted by Uber, which arranges 
transportation;65 Soothe, an on-demand massage service;66 or Glamsquad, which sends 
hair stylists to people’s homes.67 These businesses have little to do with free expression, 
though we have seen business in the on-demand economy asserting section 230’s 
protection, with some success.68 If those companies operated in physical space, they 
could not escape liability for failing to meet reasonable duties of care.69  
 
No doubt, providing a safe harbor for massive social networks, search engines, and ISPs 
has been beneficial. If communication conduits like ISPs did not enjoy section 230 
immunity, they would likely remove valuable online content at the request of hecklers 
to avoid distributor liability.70 The same is true of search engines that index the vast 
universe of online content and produce relevant information to users in seconds and, 
for that matter, social media providers that host millions, even billions, of users.71  
 
                                               
63 Homes, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/s/homes.  
64 Hinton v. Amazon, 72 F. Supp. 3d 685, 687 (S.D. Miss. 2014) (granting dismissal on section 230 grounds 
because “claims against eBay arise or stem from the publication of information on www.ebay.com 
created by third parties”). 
65 See Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2017). 
66 Soothe: In Home Massage Delivered to You, ITUNES, https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/soothe-in-home-
massage-delivered-to-you/id811054908?mt=8.  
67 Rebecca Adams, Need a Blowout at Home Within the Hour? There’s an App for that, and it’s Called 
Glamsquad, HUFFPOST (Mar. 11, 2014), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/11/glamsquad_n_4919678.html.  
68 Compare Inman v. Technicolor, Civ. No. 11-666, 2011 WL 5829024 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2011) (finding eBay 
immune from liability  for mercury poisoning contracted by plaintiff after purchasing vacuum tubes from 
third party on site), with Airbnb v. San Francisco, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1072–73 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (finding 
section 230 immunity inapplicable because city ordinance “does not regulate what can or cannot be said 
or posted in the listings” and “creates no obligation . . . to monitor, edit, withdraw or block the content 
supplied by hosts” but rather holds Airbnb liable “only for their own conduct, namely for providing, and 
collecting a fee for, Booking Services in connection with an unregistered unit”). 
69 Landlords, shopping malls, hospitals, and banks have been held liable for enabling foreseeable criminal 
activity of third parties. Michael Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement of 
Cybercrime, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1553, 1582 (2005); see also Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 435, 437 (1999) (arguing that there is little difference between inciting misconduct and enabling it); 
Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805, 1836-38 (2010) (privacy 
invasions should be addressed by mainstream torts, including negligent enablement though section 230’s 
broad immunity has often stood in the way). 
70 CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note, at 171. 
71 Id. 
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We recognize the good that the CDA’s section 230 has done for digital expression 
specifically and for democracy generally. We are not arguing that section 230 should 
not exist or that it should it should not offer robust protections for platform providers. 
Instead, we want to bring its expressive and other costs into view along with its benefits 
so that courts can recalibrate the interpretative lens of the CDA’s safe harbor.  
 
Although section 230 has secured breathing space for the development of online 
services and countless opportunities to work, speak, and engage with others, it has 
produced unjust results. An overbroad reading of the CDA has given platforms a free 
pass to ignore destructive activities, to deliberately repost illegal material, and to solicit 
unlawful activities while ensuring that abusers cannot be identified.72 Companies have 
too limited an incentive to insist on lawful conduct on their services beyond the narrow 
scope of their terms of service. They have no duty of care to respond to users or larger 
societal goals. They have no accountability for destructive uses of their services, even 
when they encourage those uses. In addition, platforms have invoked section 230 in an 
effort to immunize lots of activity that has very little to do with speech.73 
 
The broad sweeping interpretation of section 230’s immunity eliminates incentives for 
better behavior by those in the best position to minimize harm.74 As Citizen Media Law 
Project’s Sam Bayard has explained, a site operator can enjoy section 230’s protection all 
the while “building a whole business around people saying nasty things about others, 
and . . . affirmatively choosing not to track user information that would make it possible 
for an injured person to go after the person directly responsible.”75  
 
Let’s take stock of some providers and users whose activities have been immunized 
from liability under the broad approach to section 230: 
 
- Revenge porn operator whose business was devoted to posting of people’s nude 
images without consent;76 
- Gossip site that urged users to send in “dirt” and fanned the flames with snarky 
comments;77  
                                               
72 Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note, at 118. 
73 Hinton v. Amazon, 72 F. Supp. 3d 685, 687 (S.D. Miss. 2014). 
74 Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note, at 118; Mark Lemley, Rationalizing ISP Safe Harbors (Stanford 
Public Law Working Paper, No. 979836), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=979836. 
75 Sam Bayard, New Jersey Prosecutors Set Sights on Juicy Campus, DIGITAL MEDIA LAW PROJECT (Mar. 21, 
2008), http://www.dmlp.org/blog/2008/new-jersey-prosecutors-set-sights-juicycampus.  
76 CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, at 168-81. As the advocacy group the Cyber Civil Rights 
Initiative, run by Dr. Holly Jacobs and Professor Mary Anne Franks has shown, there are countless sites 
whose raison d’être is the peddling of nonconsensual pornography.  
77 Jones v. Dirty World, 755 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2014); see Eric Goldman, Want to Encourage Gossipy Content? 
Go for It—Sarah Jones v. The Dirty, FORBES (June 17, 2014), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2014/06/17/want-to-encourage-gossipy-content-online-
go-for-it/#20a030132e09. 
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- Message board that knew about users’ illegal activity yet refused to collect 
information that would allow them to be held accountable;78 
- Purveyor of sex trade advertisements whose policies and architecture were 
designed to prevent the detection of sex-trafficking;79 
- Auction site facilitating the sale of goods that risked serious harm;80 
- Individual who forwarded a defamatory email with a comment that “everything 
would come into daylight;”81 
Blanket immunity gives platforms a license to solicit illegal activity, including sex-
trafficking, child sexual exploitation, or nonconsensual pornography.82 Site operators 
have no reason to take down material that is clearly defamatory or invasive of privacy.83 
They have no incentive to respond to clear instances of criminality or tortious behavior. 
Victims have no leverage to insist that operators take down destructive posts.  
 
III. Modest Solutions 
 
It is not inevitable that society suffers these harmful consequences in exchange for a 
legal environment that fosters speech and innovation. It’s a choice—and it’s a bad 
choice. Ideally, since section 230 does not actually compel it, the solution would be for 
courts to interpret section 230 in a manner more consistent with its text, context, and 
history. That would go a long way to incentivize efforts to deter illegal material, which 
is what the CDA’s drafters set out to do in the first place. This is probably a long-shot 
given the judiciary’s current understanding of the law. If that is right, the only course is 
a potential statutory fix. We suggest a course correction for the courts and, if needed, a 
modest statutory change that would help reorient the current liability environment. 
 
A. Interpretative Shift 
 
As a preliminary matter, courts should not apply section 230’s safe harbor unless the 
claims relate to the publication of user-generated content. Some recent decisions have 
                                               
78 Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note, at 118 n.388; Bayard, supra note (arguing that section 230 should 
not but nonetheless would immunize from liability sites like AutoAdmit and Juicy Campus that solicited 
defamation and told users that it would do what they could to prevent them from being traced and held 
accountable). 
79 Backpage, 817 F.3d at 16. 
80 Inman v. Technicolor, Civ. No. 11-666, 2011 WL 5829024 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2011).  
81 Phan v. Pham, 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 791 (App. Ct. 2010). 
82 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 159 
(2007). 
83 Indeed, the broad reading of section 230 is why revenge porn operators have been so brazen about their 
business model. CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note, at 173–76. Some operators have learned 
the hard way that section 230 does not protect them from liability related to their own wrongdoing. Id. 
Kevin Bollaert was convicted of engaging in an extortion scheme in California after he charged $500 a 
photo for the removal of nonconsensual pornography. Id. Hunter Moore pleaded guilty to federal 
conspiracy to hack women’s computers to steal intimate images. Id.  
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embraced this approach. In Doe v. Internet Brands,84 two men used a networking site 
devoted to the modeling industry to lure the plaintiff to an audition where they 
drugged her, raped her, and recorded the rape.85 The woman sued the site’s owner 
because it knew about the rapists’ use of the site but never issued a warning about it. 
The Ninth Circuit rejected the section 230 defense because the defendant was not being 
sued for publishing third-party content.86 Because the lawsuit centered on defendant’s 
failure to warn plaintiff about the rape scheme rather than for its failure to edit or 
remove content, the court rejected the defendant’s invocation of section 230.87  
 
This reading of the statute is consistent with the fact that “publisher” and “speaker” are 
technical terms of art in defamation and intellectual property law.88 The Prodigy 
decision, which prompted lawmakers to adopt the safe harbor, involved defamation 
law. Had Congress intended to extend a broad cloak of immunity to providers beyond 
decisions related to the publication of content, one would expect it to have said so. 
Congress did not even prohibit holding providers liable for the dissemination of 
information; it merely prohibited a finding that a provider was a “publisher” or 
“speaker.” Courts should, at a minimum, limit the statute to those terms. 
 
This reading would set a limit on the kinds of claims covered by section 230. Many legal 
theories advanced under the law do not turn on whether a defendant is a “publisher” or 
“speaker.” Liability for aiding and abetting others’ wrongful acts does not depend on 
the manner in which aid was provided. Designing a site to enable defamation or sex 
trafficking could result in liability in the absence of a finding that a site was being sued 
for publishing or speaking. 
 
In addition to a narrow reading of “publisher” and “speaker” under section 230(c)(1), 
courts should limit its application to Good Samaritans.89 Section 230’s title reflects this 
purpose: “protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material.” So does 
subsection (c)’s subtitle: “protection for ‘Good Samaritan' blocking and screening of 
offensive material.” Although titles added by non-legislative compilers are entitled to 
little weight, section 230’s title was enacted by Congress and signed by the President, 
and hence deserves deference.90  
 
                                               
84 824 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2016). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 851. 
87 Id. at 853. 
88 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 581 (1977); Jonathan Zittrain, What the Publisher Can Teach the Patient: 
Intellectual Property and Privacy in an Era of Trusted Privication, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1201 (2000); Pamela 
Samuelson & Robert J. Glushko, Intellectual Property Rights for Digital Library and Hypertext Publishing 
Systems, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 237 (1993). 
89 Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 116 n. 377 (2009). 
90 Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 146–47 (2008); RUTH SULLIVAN, DRIEDGER ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
STATUTES 253-58 (3d ed. 1994). 
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Sites like The Dirty and Backpage have successfully argued that section 230(c)(1) 
provides them blanket immunity related to user-generated content. They read a 
provision enacted to encourage providers to restrict abusive material to shield them 
from liability for encouraging the posting of such material. This interpretation 
undermines the congressional goal of incentivizing self-regulation.91   
 
The courts should certainly not extend the CDA’s safe harbor to actively Bad 
Samaritans. Instead, section 230(c)(1) should be read to apply only to “Good 
Samaritans” envisioned by its drafters: providers or users engaged in good-faith efforts 
to restrict illegal activity, as was true of Prodigy. None of the CDA’s con­gres­sional 
purposes apply where platforms bene­fit from material’s de­struc­tive nature. 
Extending immunity to Bad Samaritans under­mines section 230’s mission by 
eliminating incentives for better behavior by those in the best position to minimize 
harm. Treating abusive website operators and Good Samaritans alike de-values the 
efforts of the latter and may result in less of the very kind of blocking that CDA in 
general, and section 230 in particular, sought to promote.92 
 
What activity would warrant treating a provider as a Good Samaritan under section 
230(c)(1)? Grants of immunity typically seek to protect and encourage specific beneficial 
acts. That is why law often immunizes Good Samaritans for negligence but not for 
intentional torts or crimes.93 For instance, under state law, physicians may enjoy 
immunity from liability for volunteering to treat a stricken stranger. Protection from 
liability does not extend to the Good Samaritan’s practicing medicine without a license 
or intentionally harming the sick stranger. If providers or users engage in good faith 
efforts to restrict abusive material, they should be immune from liability even if they 
were negligent or even reckless in doing so.94 By contrast, the immunity should not 
apply to platforms designed to host illegality or that deliberately host illegal content.  
 
What about The Dirty? The site should not be protected from liability since it is 
designed for the express purpose of hosting defamation and privacy invasions. To 
immunize it would turn the notion of the Good Samaritan on its head since its interests 
are aligned with the abusers. Enjoying section 230 would be a windfall for the site 
operator who gives lip service to preventing defamation in the site’s terms of service 
but encourages his “Dirty Army” to email him “dirt” and chooses which gossip to post.  
                                               
91 Section 230(e)(3) disclaims any intent “to prevent any State from enforcing any State law that is 
consistent with this section” but bars any “that is inconsistent with this section.” Ascertaining section 
230’s effect on operators’ liability for state law re­quires an analysis of its purpose.  
92 Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note, at 116. 
93 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (providing no prosecutorial immunity for Attorney 
General’s authorization of wiretaps for purported national security purposes). 
94 Olivier Sylvain has a thoughtful proposal to revise the Good Samaritan obligation in section 230 to shift 
away from good-faith efforts at self-regulation. Olivier Sylvain, Intermediary Design Duties, 50 CONN. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2017). Instead, Professor Sylvain would bar the immunity when providers process and 
publish user data in ancillary or secondary markets in ways that their originating users did not intend. Id.  
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Now back to Omegle. If the site were designed to facilitate child sexual-exploitation, 
then it should certainly not be immunized from liability. But let’s suppose this is not the 
case; after all, the site does say it is monitoring video chats and warns users that sexual 
predators have been known to use its services. Imagine that the site is given credible 
information about a specific sexual predator using its services and decides to do 
nothing about it. The family of a child exploited by that predator should be able to sue 
the site for knowingly enabling criminal activity. Even if the site knows that predators 
are using its services and takes no meaningful action to stop that, it should not be 
categorically immune from suit related to the decision to make its service available to 
predators. There is no particular reason, even under current law, to treat the decision to 
allow predators access to children as the act of a “publisher” or “speaker.” And it 
certainly isn’t the act of a Good Samaritan. 
 
By contrast, Twitter likely would enjoy immunity from liability for the delayed removal 
of ISIL accounts. Depending on the circumstance, the failure to remove specific ISIL 
accounts might be understood as negligent or reckless conduct falling within the safe 
harbor immunity. Given the scale of Twitter’s user base (in the hundreds of millions), 
Twitter should be immunized from liability for failing to remove accounts about which 
it had not been notified or for removing accounts after a normal review process. The 
platform is currently engaged in good-faith screening efforts. In the first six months of 
2017, the platform removed more than 377,000 pro-terrorism accounts.95 Sustained 
failure to remove an account despite repeated notifications, by contrast, might well strip 
the company of immunity in a specific case. Note that this would not in and of itself 
give rise to liability. Instead, it would merely require that Twitter defend a suit on its 
merits rather than being automatically shielded from answering claims asserted against 
it. 
 
B. Legislative Proposal 
  
If the courts decline to move section 230 in this direction, Congress should consider 
statutory changes. There have been several suggestions for fixing section 230. The 
National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) has urged Congress to amend 
section 230 to exempt state criminal laws.96 This proposal grew out of concerns about 
                                               
95 Going forward the problem for the major social media sites like Twitter is not going to be removing too 
little extremist speech but rather removing too much in the face of threatened regulation by the EU 
Commission and EU member states. See Danielle Keats Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and 
Censorship Creep, NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming). EU countries have effectively compelled the major 
tech companies to adopt their speech norms with threats of new laws and penalties, which poses serious 
risk of censorship creep. Id. 
96 Mike Masnick, More Details Emerge as States’ Attorneys General Seek to Hold Back Innovation on the Internet, 
TECHDIRT (June 19, 2013), 
https://www.techdirt.com/blog/innovation/articles/20130619/01031623524/more-details-emerge-as-
states-attorneys-general-seek-to-hold-back-innovation-internet.shtml  
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advertisements for child-sex traffickers. But the NAAG proposal would require online 
providers to shoulder burdensome legal compliance with countless state criminal laws 
that have nothing to do with the most troubling uses of online platforms, such as child 
sex-trafficking, stalking, and nonconsensual pornography. 
 
A modest alternative to a sweeping elimination of the immunity for state law would be 
to eliminate the immunity for the worst actors. As one of us (Citron) has proposed, sites 
that encourage destructive online abuse or which are principally used for that purpose 
should not enjoy immunity from liability.97 Mirroring section 230’s current exemption 
of federal law and intellectual property, the amendment could state, “Nothing in 
section 230 shall be construed to limit or expand the application of civil or criminal 
liability for any website or other content host that purposefully encourages cyber 
stalking, nonconsensual pornography, sex trafficking, child sexual exploitation, or that 
principally hosts such material.”98  
  
A broader though still balanced approach would be to clarify the reach of section 
230(c)(1), which could be revised as follows: “No provider or user of an interactive 
computer service that takes reasonable steps to prevent unlawful uses of its services shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider in any action arising out of the publication of content provided by that 
information content provider.”  
 
With this revision, platforms would enjoy immunity from liability if they could show 
that their response to unlawful uses of their services in general was reasonable. Such a 
determination would take into account differences among online entities. ISPs and 
social networks with millions of postings a day cannot plausibly respond to complaints 
of abuse immediately, let alone within a day or two. On the other hand, they may be 
able to deploy technologies to detect content previously deemed unlawful.99 The duty 
of care will evolve as technology improves.100 To return to some examples, Twitter 
would be in a strong position to argue that it has taken reasonable steps to address ISIS 
and other terrorist content on its platform--thus it would likely enjoy 230 immunity for 
                                               
97 CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note, at 177. 
98 Id. In amending section 230, Congress could import the definition of cyberstalking from federal 
criminal law, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A. Id. 
99 What comes to mind is Facebook’s effort to use hashing technology to detect and remove 
nonconsensual pornography that it has previously deemed prohibited on its site. One of us (Citron) is 
currently serving on a small task force of advisers to Facebook concerning the potential for such screening 
tools to address the problem of nonconsensually posted intimate images. 
100 Current screening technology is far more effective against some kinds of abusive material than others; 
progress may produce cost-effective means of defeating other attacks. For instance, with current 
technologies, it is difficult if not impossible to automate without human review the detection of certain 
forms of illegal activity. For instance, that is certainly true of threats, which requires an understanding of 
the context to determine its objectionable nature. 
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such postings. Omegle, we suspect, could make no such showing; it would likely not be 
immune under such a standard. 
  
C. The Sky Will Not Fall 
 
Our proposal will face opposition on two major grounds. The first involves free speech; 
the second concerns innovation. In this section, we respond to both concerns.  
 
A broad-sweeping immunity for online platforms is not required by the First 
Amendment. Section 230 involves a policy layer on top of the First Amendment, and we 
are proposing a decidedly modest shift in it. Our proposals would not eliminate section 
230’s safe harbor. Instead, the safe harbor would be limited to providers or users that 
have taken reasonable steps to prevent illegality of which plaintiffs are complaining.  
 
Our proposal leaves dramatically more protection in place than is currently accorded 
the physical operations of newspapers or colleges. The Washington Post, for instance, 
does not enjoy blanket immunity from having to defend a lawsuit for publishing an 
article. Color us skeptical that online providers really need dramatically more protection 
than do newspapers to protect free expression in the digital age--and particularly, that 
they need that protection for all sorts of actions that have nothing to do with speech. In 
the world we envision, the CDA’s immunity provision would be unavailable to 
operators only when they cannot make a cogent argument that they are behaving 
reasonably to stop illegal activity that can be proscribed consistent with the First 
Amendment. The consequence of that failure, in our scheme, is not even liability; it is 
merely the removal of an absolute shield from the possibility of liability. 
 
We are skeptical that Section 230, as currently interpreted, is really optimizing free 
speech. It gives an irrational degree of free speech benefit to harassers and scofflaws, 
but ignores important free speech costs to victims. Individuals have difficulty 
expressing themselves in the face of online assaults.101 They shut down their blogs, sites, 
and social network profiles not because they tire of them, but because continuing them 
provokes their attackers.102 Civil liberties organization Electronic Frontier Foundation 
has recognized that cyber harassment is “profoundly damaging to the free speech and 
privacy rights of the people targeted.”103 Neil Richards and one of us (Citron) has 
argued that a robust culture of free speech online can be achieved without shielding 
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from liability those who deliberately repost illegal material or those who run sites 
whose business model is hosting such abuse.104 An environment of perfect impunity for 
intermediaries that facilitate online abuse is not an obvious win for free speech if the 
result is that the harassers speak unhindered and the harassed retreat in fear offline.  
 
A recalibrated section 230 would, we think, do a better job of incentivizing the parties in 
the best position to protect against risks to free expression engendered by online abuse. 
By contrast, the current approach allows providers to host abuse without regard for the 
harm it inflicts. As one of us (Wittes) has argued with Gabriella Blum in a different 
context, the Internet “lacks any kind of sensible allocation of risk.”105 ISPs and software 
vendors suffer no real consequences for bad cybersecurity; thus, bad security and low 
quality are the norm.106 If section 230 is left as is, the same will continue to be true of 
online platforms and the illegal behavior they host. Of course, websites whose business 
model is abuse have no incentive to restrict it. But neither do sites that know about 
unlawful activity and keep it up in case it might appeal to some users. 
 
A recalibrated section 230 might help tech companies resist the EU Commission’s 
efforts to coerce changes in their policies regarding terrorist and hate speech. In the past 
year, the EU Commission has been able to extract agreements from Facebook, 
Microsoft, Twitter, and YouTube to remove hate speech in 24 hours and to create an 
industry database of hashed images of banned terrorist material.107 The EU Commission 
has positioned its demands as a necessary counter to the American Wild West approach 
to intermediary liability. Our proposal would give heft to the argument that tech 
companies have good reason to act reasonably in the face of illegal activity and that the 
EU’s demands have gone too far.   
 
What’s more, to the extent that our proposal is resisted on the grounds that online 
platforms deserve special protection from liability because they operate as zones of 
public discourse, we offer the modest rejoinder that while the internet is special, it is not 
so fundamentally special that all normal legal rules should not apply to it. Yes, online 
platforms facilitate expression, along with other key life opportunities, but no more and 
no less so than do workplaces, schools, and coffee shops, which are all also zones of 
conversations and are not categorically exempted from legal responsibility for operating 
safely. The law has not destroyed expression in workplaces, homes, and other social 
venues. When courts began recognizing claims under Title VII for hostile sexual work 
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environments, employers argued that the cost of liability would force them to shutter 
and if not would ruin the camaraderie of workspaces.108 As we know now, that has not 
been the case. Rather, those spaces are now available to all on equal terms while firms 
have more than survived in the face of Title VII liability. The same should be true for 
networked spaces. 
 
This argument is part of a much broader argument that a strong liability shield is 
necessary to help the internet flourish. It made a certain amount of sense in the early 
years of the internet, when it was unclear how robustly it would develop. It makes little 
sense now. As the Ninth Circuit has underscored: 
 
The Internet is no longer a fragile new means of communication that could 
easily be smothered in the cradle by overzealous enforcement of laws and 
regulations applicable to brick-and-mortar businesses. Rather, it has become a 
dominant—perhaps the preeminent—means through which commerce is 
conducted. And its vast reach into the lives of millions is exactly why we must 
be careful not to exceed the scope of the immunity provided by Congress and 
thus give online businesses an unfair advantage over their real-world 
counterparts, which must comply with laws of general applicability.109 
 
The nature of the litigation protection that is essential in the early life of an industry is 
very different from the proper protection given to a mature one. Many people forget 
now that the automobile industry had nearly total product liability protection in tort for 
deaths and injuries in car crashes through the 1960s—even when they resulted from 
known defects that manufacturers declined to fix.110 As the industry matured, the 
liability protection weakened, and cars became dramatically safer.  
 
This is part of a notable pattern. Technological advances tend to create large, successful 
business entities. Those injured by new technologies see those businesses as fitting 
sources of compensation. The building of canals, railroads, and reservoirs at the dawn 
of the Industrial Revolution contributed much to the economy, yet they also inflicted 
waves of destruction on adjoining property owners and towns, much of it wholly 
unnecessary.111  
 
The law’s reaction to claims against such large actors for new types of harms typically 
goes through distinct phases.112 Law first recognizes the new form of harm, but not the 
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benefit that the new technology has occasioned.113 This drives it to adapt existing 
theories of liability to reach that harm. After the technology’s benefits become apparent, 
law then reverses course, seeing its earlier awards of liabil-ity as threats to technological 
progress and granting sweeping protection to the firms in the new industry.114 Once the 
technology becomes better established, law recognizes that not all liability awards 
threaten its survival. It then separates activities that are indispensable to the pursuit of 
the new industry from behavior that causes unnecessary harm to third parties.115 This is 
what the celebrated Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. case accomplished and much of 
the reason the negligence standard emerged.116 As the new technology becomes more 
familiar, law refines the distinction between ac-ceptable and unacceptable harms, at 
times setting liabil-ity rules to drive the development of less de-struc-tive means of 
carrying out the necessary functions.  
 
We want to suggest that with respect to content intermediaries, we are currently in the 
midst of this pattern. The first, hyper-vigilant, stage can be seen in a few early cases, 
notably Prodigy, in which courts found online service providers liable for offensive 
material that came through their portals. Ironically, Prodigy’s liability was based in part 
on its having attempted to screen out troubling material. That its good faith remedial 
measures were used to establish liability moved Congress to immunize such actions in 
the CDA’s section 230. The CDA checked a particular excess of law’s hyper-vigilant 
stage. The law reached the next hyper-protective stage as courts read section 230 to 
grant sweeping immunity far beyond what its words and context supported. These 
efforts have prevented the courts from ex-ploring what standard of care ought to apply 
to ISPs and website operators. 
 
Our proposal seeks to move the law to the third, more analytical stage. It opposes 
holding ISPs liable merely because of their deep pockets and inevitable proximity to 
harm. It thus is sympathetic to the results, if not the reasoning, of many of the cases 
rejecting liability. On the other hand, it equally opposes blanket grants of immunity that 
leave innocent victims of cyber mobs, sex traffickers, terrorist violence, and other forms 
of abuse without effective recourse even where they can show that intermediaries 
encouraged the bad actors who injured them.  
 
Instead, our proposal seeks to establish a reasonable standard of care that will reduce 
opportunities for abuses without interfering with the further development of a vibrant 
internet or unintentionally turning innocent platforms into involuntary insurers for 
those injured through their sites. Approaching the problem as one of setting an 
appropriate standard of case more readily allows differentiating between different 
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kinds of online actors, setting a different rule for websites established to facilitate mob 
attacks from that applied to large ISPs linking millions to the Internet.  Reaching this 
stage, however, requires abandoning the hyper-protective stage in which many courts 
currently are mired. 
 
Conclusion 
 
An immunity provision designed to encourage voluntary blocking and restriction of 
objectionable material should not shield providers that encourage or deliberately host 
such material. An overbroad reading of the CDA has given platforms a free pass to 
ignore destructive activities and, worse, to solicit unlawful activities while doing what 
they can to ensure that abusers cannot be identified. With modest adjustments to 
section 230, either through judicial interpretation or legislation, we can have a robust 
culture of free speech online without extending the safe harbor to Bad Samaritans. 
